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FIFT H AMENDMENT-THE ACT OF
PRODUCTION PRIVILEGE: THE
SUPREME COURT'S PORTRAIT OF
A DUALISTIC RECORD
CUSTODIAN
Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Braswell v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court
rejected the fifth amendment 2 claim of a one-man corporation's 3
record custodian,4 who resisted a subpoena to produce documents
on the ground that his act of producing the documents would tend
to incriminate himself.5 The Court ruled instead that the common
law collective entity doctrine 6 precluded petitioner Braswell's
claimed act of production privilege.7
In two decisions prior to Braswell, however, the Supreme Court
"embarked upon a new course of Fifth Amendment analysis" and
enunciated a compelled testimony standard.8 In Fisher v. United
1 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988).
2 The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall [any person] be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L.
REv. 671, 679-98 (1968) and S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 385-88 (2d
ed. 1984), for an examination of the traditional justifications for fifth amendment
protection.
3 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom.
Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988). For a description of the extent of
Braswell's control over the corporations, see infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
4 A "corporate record custodian" is any person who has custody or charge of corpo-
rate papers, records, or documents. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 347 (5th ed. 1979).
5 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295.
6 The collective entity doctrine states that the fifth amendment privilege is strictly
personal and may not be invoked on behalf of a collective entity or its representatives in
their official capacity. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906).
The Court has defined a collective entity as "an organization which is recognized as
an independent entity apart from its individual members." See Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85, 92 (1974).
7 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2292. For a description of the act of production privilege,
see infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
8 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2290-91.
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States,9 the Court defined the new standard, stating that "the [fifth
amendment] privilege protects a person only against being incrimi-
nated by his own compelled testimonial communications."' 10 The
Court thus identified three factors to be determinative of fifth
amendment protection under the Court's new analysis: compulsion,
testimonial communication, and personal incrimination." The
Court subsequently applied the compelled testimony standard in
United States v. Doe.' 2 There the Court held that a sole proprietor's
act of producing documents pursuant to a subpoena was privileged
under the fifth amendment when it would effect compelled testimo-
nial self-incrimination.' 3
Nevertheless, the Braswell majority avoided applying the Court's
new standard to the record custodian of a one-man corporation. 14
The majority instead relied upon the collective entity doctrine to
reject Braswell's fifth amendment claim and affirm his citation for
contempt. 15
This Note examines the Braswell decision and concludes that the
majority erred in applying the formalistic collective entity doctrine
instead of the compelled testimony standard which is both easier for
courts to apply and more equitable in its treatment of individual
claimants. The majority opinion also erred in its reliance on and
analysis of the white-collar crime rationale, in adopting constructive
use immunity in disregard of recent Court precedent, and in refus-
ing to accord constitutional protection to testimonial acts.
9 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
10 Id. at 409. In Fisher, the Court held that a taxpayer's act of producing his account-
ant's workpapers was not sufficiently testimonial, and therefore not privileged. Id. at
411. The Court was persuaded by the fact that the workpapers belonged to and were
prepared by the accountant. Thus, the Court stated that the taxpayer's production was a
" question... not of testimony but of surrender.'" Id. (quoting In re Harris, 221 U.S.
274, 279 (1911)).
11 Id. at 410.
12 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
13 Id. at 613, 617. The Court stated in United States v. Doe that "[a]lthough the
contents of a document may not be privileged, the act of producing the document may
be." Id. at 612.
In Doe v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2341 (1988), the Court applied the compelled
testimony standard to a petitioner's attempt to resist compliance with a consent directive
which compelled him to authorize foreign banks to disclose his account records. The
Court rejected the claimed fifth amendment privilege, holding that the consent directive
was not sufficiently testimonial. Id. at 2352.
14 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2291, 2295.
15 Id. at 2292, 2295.
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II. FACTUAL SUMMARY OF BRASWELL
Randy Braswell operated a sole proprietorship1 6 from 1965 un-
til 1980.17 His business consisted primarily of buying and selling
equipment, land, timber, and oil and gas interests.' 8 In 1980, Bras-
well incorporated his business under the name Worldwide Machin-
ery Sales, Inc.' 9 He formed a second corporation in 1981 named
Worldwide Purchasing, Inc.20
Braswell incorporated both businesses in the state of Missis-
sippi. 21 In accordance with Mississippi law, 22 each corporation had
three directors - Braswell, his wife, and his mother.23 Braswell
named his wife and mother as secretary-treasurer and vice-presi-
dent, respectively, of both corporations.2 4 Neither individual, how-
ever, had authority over the business affairs of the corporations. 25
Braswell was the president and sole shareholder of both corpo-
rations.26 He conducted all of his business and personal affairs
through the corporations. 27 He personally guaranteed the corpora-
tions' loans,28 and claimed to have " 'absolute, total, [and] com-
plete' control over the corporations." 29 Moreover, Braswell claimed
that he was so synonymous with the corporations that he acquired
the nickname "Worldwide." 30
The government subsequently commenced a tax fraud investi-
gation of Braswell's personal income tax returns for the years 1982
through 1985. 31 In August 1986, a federal grand jury issued a sub-
16 A "sole proprietorship" is a business owned and controlled exclusively by one
person. BLACK'S LAw DICTONARY 1098 (5th ed. 1979).





22 Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-69 (1972) (repealed 1987).
23 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 191 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom.
Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988).
27 Id. The personal expenses of Braswell and his wife were paid out of the corporate
checking accounts. Id. at 192. All of his personal assets, including his house, were
owned in the names of the corporations. Id. The personal credit cards used by Braswell
and his wife were also in the names of the corporations. Id.
28 Id. This fact is significant in proving that Braswell did not incorporate his busi-
nesses to escape personal liability. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
29 In re GrandJury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 192.
30 Brief for Petitioner at 6, Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988)(No. 87-
3).
31 Id. at 40. The scope of the investigation also included the corporations' returns.
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poena personally to "'Randy Braswell, President Worldwide Ma-
chinery, Inc. [and] Worldwide Purchasing, Inc.'"32 The subpoena
did not require Braswell to testify, but ordered him to produce cer-
tain documents of the two corporations A3
Braswell moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that his
act of producing the documents would violate his fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination. 34 The district court denied the mo-
tion and ordered Braswell to produce the documents. 35 The court
held that the collective entity doctrine3 6 precluded Braswell from
asserting a fifth amendment privilege for the production of corpo-
rate documents.3 7 Braswell subsequently appeared before the
grand jury but refused to produce the documents.38 The district
court held Braswell in contempt of court and suspended his commit-
ment, pending an appeal.3 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's denial of Braswell's motion to quash the
subpoena.40 The court cited Bellis v. United States4 1 as support for
the proposition that a corporate record custodian may not refuse a
32 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286 (citation omitted).
33 Id. The subpoena ordered Braswell to produce the following documents:
Receipts and disbursement journals; general ledger and subsidiaries; accounts re-
ceivable [and] accounts payable ledgers, cards, and all customer data; bank records
of savings and checking accounts, including statements, checks, and deposit tickets;
contracts, invoices - sales and purchase - conveyances, and correspondence; min-
utes and stock books and ledgers; loan disclosure statements and agreements; liabil-
ity ledgers; and retained copies of Forms 1120, W-2, W-4, 1099, 940 and 941.
Id. at 2286 n.1.
34 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 192.
35 Id.
36 See supra note 6.
37 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286. The district court noted that "Braswell was obviously
doing business through the corporate name but was managing the affairs of the corpora-
tion as close to the manner in which a sole proprietorship would be handled as almost
could be conceived." In re GrandJury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 192. Nevertheless, the
district court rejected Braswell's argument that "the collective entity doctrine does not
apply when a corporation is so small that it constitutes nothing more than the individ-
ual's alter ego." Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286.
38 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 192.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 193.
41 417 U.S. 85 (1974). The Court held in Bellis that a partner in a three-person law
firm could not refuse a subpoena to produce partnership documents on the ground that
the documents' contents might tend to incriminate him. Id. at 101. While the Court
employed the collective entity doctrine to reject the claimed privilege as to the docu-
ments' contents, the Court endorsed the compelled testimony standard in principle if
not in name: "[T]he privilege against compulsory self-incrimination should be 'limited
to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrim-
ination through his own testimony.'" Id. at 89-90 (quoting United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 701 (1944)).
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subpoena to produce documents on fifth amendment grounds, re-
gardless of the corporation's size.42 Thus, the court ruled that
"Braswell's contention that his 'one-man' corporations are not col-
lective entities must fail."'43
The Courts of Appeals had split on the issue of whether a cor-
porate record custodian may assert a fifth amendment privilege as to
the act of production to resist a subpoena for documents. 44 The
United States Supreme Court granted Braswell's petition for writ of
certiorari 45 to resolve this split in the circuits. 46
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In Braswell v. United States,47 the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' denial of Braswell's mo-
tion to quash a subpoena to produce documents. 48 The Court held
that the custodian of corporate records may not resist a subpoena to
produce documents on the ground that the act of production will
personally incriminate him in violation of the fifth amendment.49
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 50 began the
opinion by reaffirming two tenets historically promulgated in the
Court's fifth amendment analysis: the contents of business docu-
ments are not privileged under the fifth amendment; 51 and artificial
42 In re GrandJury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 192.
43 Id.
44 The Second, Third, Fourth, Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits have al-
lowed an act of production privilege for the custodian of collective entity documents.
See In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In re GrandJury No. 86-3
(Will Roberts Corp.), 816 F.2d 569, 573 (1 1th Cir. 1987); United States v. Lang, 792
F.2d 1235, 1240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986); United States v. Sancetta,
788 F.2d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1986); In re GrandJury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 526 (3d
Cir. 1985)(en banc).
The First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, however, have denied the
act of production privilege to collective entity custodians. See In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena (85-W-71-5), 784 F.2d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1048
(1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 148 (6th Cir.)(en
banc), cert. denied sub nom. Morganstern v. United States, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena (Lincoln), 767 F.2d 1130, 1131 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Malis, 737 F.2d 1511, 1512 (9th Cir. 1984); In re GrandJury Proceedings (Vargas), 727
F.2d 941, 945 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); In re GrandJury Proceedings
United States, 626 F.2d 1051, 1053 (1st Cir. 1980).
45 Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 64 (1987).
46 Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2287 (1988).
47 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988).
48 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2287.
49 Id.
50 The ChiefJustice was joined by justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor.
Id. at 2286.
51 Id. at 2287 (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)).
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entities may not assert a fifth amendment privilege.52 The Court
noted that Braswell challenged neither of these principles, but
rather, asserted that "his act of producing the documents [had] in-
dependent testimonial significance, which would incriminate him in-
dividually, and that the Fifth Amendment prohibits government
compulsion of that act."153 The majority indicated that this argu-
ment was premised on the Court's decisions in Fisher v. United States
and United States v. Doe.54
ChiefJustice Rehnquist proceeded to summarize the Fisher and
Doe opinions. The Chief Justice stated that the issue in Fisher was
whether an attorney may assert a fifth amendment privilege to resist
a subpoena to produce client tax records prepared by the client's
accountant. 55 According to the majority, the Court in Fisher stated
that the fifth amendment prohibits compelled testimonial self-in-
crimination, and recognized that:
"[t]he act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena neverthe-
less has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the con-
tents of the papers produced 56 .... The elements of compulsion are
clearly present, but the more difficult issues are whether the tacit aver-
ments of the taxpayer are both 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for
purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment." '57
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Fisher concluded that the act
of production in that case would not effect testimonial self-
incrimination. 58
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that Doe held that a sole
proprietor possessed a fifth amendment privilege prohibiting com-
pelled production of business records. 59 The ChiefJustice hypothe-
52 Id. (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974)).
53 Id. (emphasis added).
54 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2287 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 391, and Doe, 465 U.S. at
605).
55 Id. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, Fisher determined the availability of a fifth
amendment privilege to the attorney by determining whether the taxpayer-client was
protected under the fifth amendment. Id.
56 Courts following the act of production doctrine generally imply three testimonial
statements manifested in the production of documents: 1) an admission that the docu-
ments exist; 2) that they are in the possession of the custodian; and 3) that the custodian
believes them to be authentic. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410; Doe, 465 U.S. at 613 n.ll.
57 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2287 (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410).
58 Id. at 2287-88 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411). Fisher ruled that the existence and
location of the accountant's workpapers was a foregone conclusion, and thus the act of
production had no testimonial value. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. Furthermore, the Court
noted that the workpapers were prepared by and belonged to the accountant. Id. Thus
the Court found little testimonial significance in the taxpayer's act of production. Id.
59 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2288. The Court in Doe did not examine the testimonial
aspects of the proprietor's act of production. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614. Rather, as the major-
ity indicated, the Court deferred to the district and appellate courts, "which had found
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sized that, had Braswell operated his business as a sole
proprietorship, he would have been entitled under Doe to an oppor-
tunity to prove the testimonial and incriminating nature of his act of
production.60 The majority asserted, however, that courts have
long distinguished between corporations and individuals for pur-
poses of fifth amendment analysis. 6 ' The Chief Justice stated that
the Court determines the fifth amendment rights of the former ac-
cording to the collective entity doctrine.62
Before applying the collective entity doctrine to the facts of
Braswell, ChiefJustice Rehnquist traced the Court's development of
the doctrine. According to the majority, the Court first enunciated
the collective entity rule in Hale v. Henkel.63 The majority observed
that Hale rejected a corporate officer's attempt to resist a subpoena
to produce documents by asserting a fifth amendment privilege on
behalf of the corporation.64 ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that Hale
distinguished between the fifth amendment protection of individu-
als and corporations, 65 and premised the distinction on the fact that
corporations are " 'creature[s] of the State,' with powers limited by
the State. ' 66 Thus, the majority observed, the state's right to de-
mand the records is merely an exercise of its power of visitation 67
over the corporation.68
Chief Justice Rehnquist described Hale as limiting the Court's
earlier decision in Boyd v. United States.69 According to the majority,
Boyd held that partnership records are the "'private books and pa-
pers' " of the partners, and therefore are protected under the fifth
amendment. 70 ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that Hale limited Boyd
that enforcing the subpoenas at issue would provide the Government [with] valuable
information." Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2288. Namely, the proprietor's act of production
would tacitly admit the documents' existence, their possession by the proprietor, and
their authenticity. Id. (citing Doe, 465 U.S. 613 n.ll). See supra note 56.
60 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2288.
61 Id. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) ("[W~e are of the opinion that there
is a clear distinction ... between an individual and a corporation, and the latter has no
right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the
State.").
62 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2288. See supra note 6.
63 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2288 (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)).
64 Id.
65 See supra note 61.
66 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2288 (quoting Hale, 201 U.S. at 74)(citation omitted).
67 A state's power of visitation over a corporation includes the power of inspection,
superintendence, direction, and regulation. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1410 (5th ed.
1979).
68 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2288 (citing Hale, 201 U.S. at 75).
69 Id. (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
70 Id. (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-635) (emphasis omitted).
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by declaring that corporate documents are not private papers, and
thus are not privileged under the fifth amendment. 71
The majority next examined Wilson v. United States,72 in which
the issue was whether a corporate officer could resist a subpoena to
produce corporate documents by asserting a personal privilege
against self-incrimination. 73 ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that the
Court rejected Wilson's claimed privilege, holding instead that the
subpoenaed documents belonged to the corporation and were not
the private papers of the officer.74 Wilson added, according to the
majority, that the state's visitatorial power over corporations would
be thwarted if an officer could assert a personal privilege over cor-
porate documents. 75
The majority noted that the next significant application of the
collective entity doctrine occurred in United States v. White. 76 Ac-
cording to the majority, White held that a labor union was a collec-
tive entity, and thus precluded a union supervisor from withholding
union documents pursuant to a subpoena. 77 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist quoted the test enunciated in White for determining when an
organization qualifies as a collective entity:
"The test ... is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances
that a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in
the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to
embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its
constituents, but rather to embody their common or group interests
71 Id.
72 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
73 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2288. Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished the issue
presented in Wilson from that presented in Hale. Id. He noted that while the petitioner
in Hale asserted a fifth amendment privilege on behalf of the corporation, the officer in
Wilson claimed a fifth amendment privilege on his own behalf. Id.
74 Id. at 2289. The majority noted that the Court also applied the Wilson holding in
Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911), and denied a fifth amendment privilege
where the government addressed the subpoena personally to the custodian. Braswell,
108 S. Ct. at 2289. The Chief Justice noted that the government addressed the sub-
poena in Wilson to the corporation, but that the Dreier Court found this distinction to be
irrelevant because the documents in both cases belonged to the corporations. Id. (citing
Dreier, 221 U.S. at 400).
75 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2289.
76 Id. (citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944)).
77 Id. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court in White reasoned that "the
Fifth Amendment privilege applies only to natural individuals and protects only private
papers," whereas record custodians of a collective entity act as agents and hold docu-
ments in a representative capacity. Id. Note, however, that the Court has since rejected
this privacy rationale as a basis for fifth amendment analysis. See infra note 205 and
accompanying text. The Chief Justice observed that, by applying the collective entity
doctrine to an unincorporated labor union, White abandoned the dontrine's premise of
maintaining the state's visitatorial power over corporations. Id. at 2290. See supra note
67.
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only. If so, the privilege cannot be invoked on behalf of the organiza-
tion or its representatives in their official capacity." 78
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist reviewed the Court's most re-
cent expansion of the collective entity doctrine. In Bellis v. United
States,79 the Chief Justice stated, the Court held that a partner in a
three-person law firm could not assert a fifth amendment privilege
to resist a subpoena to produce partnership documents.80 Accord-
ing to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Bellis Court stated that White's
collective entity test was not useful in a wide range of cases and
could not be reduced to a determination based solely on the organi-
zation's size.81 The Chief'Justice quoted Bellis, stating that " '[i]t is
well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of cor-
porate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.' "82
The majority summarized the doctrine of these cases, from Hale
to Bellis, as holding that a corporate custodian may not resist a sub-
poena for corporate records on fifth amendment grounds, regard-
less of whether the subpoena is addressed to the corporation or to
the custodian.83
The majority turned next to Braswell's argument that the col-
lective entity doctrine was limited by the Court's analysis in Fisher
and Doe.8 4 The majority restated Braswell's argument as follows:
In response to Boyd v. United States, with its privacy rationale shielding
personal books and records, the Court developed the collective entity
rule, which declares simply that corporate records are not private and
therefore are not protected by the Fifth Amendment. The collective
entity decisions were concerned with the contents of the documents
subpoenaed, however, and not with the act of production. In Fisher
and Doe, the Court moved away from the privacy based collective en-
tity rule, replacing it with a compelled testimony standard under which
the contents of business documents are never privileged but the act of
producing the documents may be. Under this new regime, the act of
production privilege is available without regard to the entity whose
records are being sought.8 5
78 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2289-90 (quoting White, 322 U.S. at 701).
79 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
80 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2290. According to the majority, the Court ruled that the
partner held the documents in a representative capacity, and thus could not claim a
personal privilege with respect to them. Id. (citing Bellis, 417 U.S. at 101).
81 Id. (citing Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100).
82 Id. (quoting Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100). It should be noted, however, that the Court in
Bellis tempered the broad language of this statement by professing that "[t]his might be
a different case if it involved a smallfamily partnership." Bellis, 417 U.S. at 101 (emphasis
added). Thus, Bellis appeared to leave open the question of the definitiveness of its
holding as applied to a small family business, such as Braswell's.
83 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2290.
84 Id.
85 Id. (citing In re GrandJury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 528 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
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Chief Justice Rehnquist proclaimed, however, that while Fisher
and Doe evidenced a new fifth amendment analysis by the Court, the
analysis in those cases did not overrule the collective entity doc-
trine.86 The ChiefJustice noted particularly that the "agency ration-
ale undergirding the collective entity decisions ... survives."'8 7 The
majority reasoned: a collective entity may act only through its
agent;8 8 such an agent holds corporate documents in a representa-
tive capacity rather than a personal capacity;8 9 the custodian's act of
production is therefore not a personal act but an act of the corpora-
tion;90 and permitting the custodian to assert a fifth amendment
privilege "would be tantamount to a claim of privilege by the corpo-
ration - which of course possesses no such privilege." 9 1
Chief Justice Rehnquist also observed that the Court rejected
the custodians' fifth amendment claims in Dreier and Bellis even
though both cases involved compelled testimonial production. 92
While the ChiefJustice admitted that the Dreier and Bellis Courts did
not examine the testimonial aspect of the act of production, he spec-
ulated that such an inquiry would not have affected the Court's
decisions.93
banc)) (citation omitted). According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, In re (Brown) recog-
nized that " '[Fisher and Doe] make the significant factor.., neither the nature of [the]
entity which owns the documents, nor the contents of documents, but rather the com-
municative or noncommunicative nature of the arguably incriminating disclosures
sought to be compelled.'" Id. (quoting In re (Brown), 768 F.2d at 528).





91 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist supported this argument with the proposition from
Wilson that " 'the custodian has no privilege to refuse production although [the docu-
ments'] contents tend to incriminate him. In assuming their custody he has accepted the
incident obligation to permit inspection.' " Id. (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 382 (1911)). Wilson, however, premised its rejection of a claimed fifth amend-
ment privilege on the incriminating nature of the documents' contents, which was not at
issue in Braswell. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 385; Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2298 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting). Rather, Braswell claimed a privilege only for his act of producing the documents.
Id. at 2287.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist also drew support from White, which stated that " '[iun their
official capacity ...[the custodians] have no privilege against self-incrimination. And
the official records ... that are held by them in a representative capacity ... cannot be
the subject of the personal privilege.'" Id. at 2291 (quoting United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 699 (1944)).
92 Id. The majority noted that the government addressed the subpoena to the custo-
dian in each case, and that the act of production would have tacitly admitted the records'
existence and possession by the custodian. Id. (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411-12).
93 Id. The Chief Justice was correct to the extent that the Dreier and Bellis Courts
applied the collective entity doctrine, which does not predetermine fifth amendment
protection on the existence of compelled testimonial incrimination. For a description of
710 [Vol. 79
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Moreover, the majority rejected the notion that Fisher and Doe
supported petitioner Braswell's claim. Chief Justice Rehnquist dis-
missed Doe as inapplicable to the issue before the Court, and limited
the Court's holding in that case to the production of documents by a
sole proprietor. 94 The Chief Justice also claimed that the Fisher
opinion "indicate[d] that the custodian of corporate records may
not interpose a Fifth Amendment objection to the compelled pro-
duction of corporate records, even though the act of production
may prove personally incriminating." 95 Fisher recognized, according
to the majority, that the Court has consistently denied a record cus-
todian's attempt to refuse a subpoena to produce documents, even
though such production has authenticated the documents,96 and ad-
mitted their existence and possession by the custodian. 97
Chief Justice Rehnquist found support for the majority's posi-
tion in Justice Brennan's concurrence in Fisher.98 Justice Brennan
espoused the notion, according to the majority, that a custodian
waives the right to exercise a personal privilege while acting as the
representative of a collective entity.99 ChiefJustice Rehnquist con-
the elements of the collective entity doctrine, see infra notes 147-50 and accompanying
text. The existence of compelled testimonial incrimination, however, is dispositive of
fifth amendment protection under the compelled testimony standard more recently es-
poused by the Court. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
94 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2292 n.5. ChiefJustice Rehnquist reasoned that the Court
refrained from discussing the collective entity doctrine in Doe because a sole proprietor
holds documents in a personal rather than representative capacity. Id.
95 Id. at 2292. This interpretation is troubling for two reasons. First, Fisher did not
involve a corporate custodian. Rather, the case involved the fifth amendment claim of an
individual taxpayer. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402 (1976). Because Chief
Justice Rehnquist strictly limited the Court's grant of fifth amendment protection in Doe
to the production of documents by a sole proprietor, see supra note 94 and accompanying
text, it is inconsistent to stretch Fisher's rejection of an individual taxpayer's privilege to
include all corporate custodians.
Secondly, Fisher rejected the taxpayer's claimed privilege for the sole reason that,
under the facts of that case, the taxpayer's act of production was not sufficiently testimo-
nial. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414. On the contrary, the Court found that the existence and
location of the papers was a "foregone conclusion." Id. at 411. The court thus "h[e]ld
that compliance with a summons directing the taxpayer to produce the accountant's doc-
uments ... would involve no incriminating testimony within the protection of the Fifth
Amendment." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414. Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement was there-
fore misleading, for an incriminating and compelled production of documents is not
accorded fifth amendment protection under Fisher only when it is insufficiently
testimonial.
96 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2292 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 413 n.14).
97 Id. (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411-12). See supra note 56. Chief Justice Rehnquist
also noted that the Fisher Court cited the collective entity decisions in support of its
holding. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2292.
98 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2292.
99 Id. The majority recognized, however, that Justice Brennan disagreed with the
Fisher majority's conclusion that the act of production was not sufficiently testimonial.
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cluded that, whether you adopt the Fisher majority opinion that the
act of production is not sufficiently testimonial, or believe that a col-
lective entity custodian waives his fifth amendment right, "the les-
son of Fisher is clear: a custodian may not resist a subpoena for
corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds."100
The majority also rejected Braswell's reliance on Curcio v. United
States o1' and indicated that that case supported the government's
position. 10 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist restated Braswell's analysis of
Curcio as follows: Curcio held that the government may not compel
the representative of a collective entity to give testimony about the
entity's records, even though the contents of the records are not
privileged; 10 3 since Fisher held that the act of production may be tes-
timonial, the government could not compel Braswell's production
of documents under Curcio if it would tend to incriminate him. 0 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected this line of reasoning and
stated instead that Curcio distinguished between "oral testimony and
other forms of incrimination." 0 5 The majority observed that, while
Curcio recognized the testimonial effect implicit in producing docu-
ments,106 the Court concluded that the government might have suc-
Id. (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 429 (Brennan, J., concurring) (" 'Nothing in the language
of [the collective entity] cases, either expressly or impliedly, indicates that the act of
production with respect to the records of business entities is insufficiently testimonial
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.' ")).
100 Id. This is a very broad reading of Fisher. See supra note 95. The Court in Fisher
rejected the taxpayer's fifth amendment claim strictly because it found that the tax-
payer's act of production was insufficiently testimonial, and therefore failed the com-
pelled testimony standard. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414. Thus, a more accurate recitation of
the Fisher "lesson" is that a custodian may not resist a subpoena for collective entity
reords on fifth amendment grounds where the act of producing the documents is insufficiently
testimonial.
101 354 U.S. 118 (1957)(holding that the fifth amendment protects a union record
custodian from testifying on the whereabouts of union documents).
102 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2293. The majority noted that in Curcio the government
served two subpoenas on an officer of a local union - one requiring the officer to pro-
duce union records and the other requiring him to testify. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2293.
The Curcio Court allowed the officer's fifth amendment claim, according to the majority,
and rejected "the Government's argument 'that the representative duty which required
the production of union records in the White case requires the giving of oral testimony
by the custodian.''" Id. (quoting Curcio, 354 U.S. at 123).
103 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2293.
104 Id.
105 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted Curcio, stating that "'[a] custodian, by assum-
ing the duties of his office, undertakes the obligation to produce the books of which he is
custodian in response to a rightful exercise of the State's visitorial [sic] powers. But he
cannot lawfully be compelled . . . to condemn himself by his own oral testimony.'" Id.
(quoting Curcio, 354 U.S. at 123-24)(emphasis added by Braswell Court). But see infra
notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
106 According to the majority, the Curcio Court realized that:
"The custodian's act of producing books or records in response to a subpoena duces
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cessfully compelled the production under the subpoena duces
tecum. 10
7
The majority warned that granting a fifth amendment privilege
to the holders of collective entity records would seriously jeopardize
the government's ability to regulate white-collar crime.' 08 Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated that such protection would inhibit govern-
ment prosecution of individuals and organizations alike.' 0 9
The majority also rejected Braswell's two solutions to this per-
ceived problem of impeding the regulation of white-collar crime:
1) address the subpoena to the corporation and allow it to select an
agent for producing the documents, or 2) grant statutory immu-
nity, 10 for the custodian's act of production."'1  ChiefJustice Rehn-
tecum is itself a representation that the documents produced are those demanded by
the subpoena. Requiring the custodian to identify or authenticate the documents
for admission in evidence merely makes explicit what is implicit in the production
itself."
Id. (quoting Curcio, 354 U.S. at 125).
107 Id. (citing Curcio, 354 U.S. at 127 n.7). A subpoena duces tecum requires the pro-
duction of documents, while a subpoena ad testificandum orders the subpoenaed party
to testify. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979).
108 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2294. The majority quoted White for the argument that:
"The greater portion of evidence of wrongdoing by an organization or its repre-
sentatives is usually found in the official records and documents of that organiza-
tion. Were the cloak of the privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records
and documents, effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be
impossible."
Id. (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944)).
109 Id. The majority claimed that granting fifth amendment protection to a custodian
holding collective entity documents would impede the prosecution of artificial entities,
since they are able to produce documents only through their agents. Id. (citing Bellis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974)).
110 A court may grant a request for statutory immunity under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003
(1982). Section 6002 states:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination,
to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to -
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee
or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the proceeding
communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not
refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any in-
formation directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for per-
jury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
Section 6003 states:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or
provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the
United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court
for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in
accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United States
attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or
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quist labelled the first solution a "chimera," '1 12 if the custodian was
the only person with knowledge of the documents' location but
could still refuse to assist the appointed replacement on the ground
that such assistance would be incriminating.' 13 The majority stated
that sending an alternate custodian on an unassisted search for doc-
uments might well result in the documents never reaching the
courthouse. 1 14
Chief Justice Rehnquist similarly disposed of the second pro-
posed solution of granting statutory immunity as to the act of pro-
duction.1 15 The Chief Justice noted that the prosecution may not
use testimony elicited under a grant of statutory immunity, either
directly or derivatively against the testifying party. 16 The majority
asserted that this limitation places a heavy burden on the state to
prove that evidence was obtained from independent sources, and
accordingly "may result in the preclusion of crucial evidence that
was obtained legitimately.""17
Finally, ChiefJustice Rehnquist relented as to the government's
evidentiary use of a custodian's act of production.1 18 The ChiefJus-
tice stated that "[b]ecause the custodian acts as a representative, the
act is deemed one of the corporation and not the individual. There-
fore, the Government concedes, as it must, that it may make no evi-
dentiary use of the 'individual act' against the individual."' 19
provide other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in
section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General,
the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, re-
quest an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to
the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982).
111 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2294.
112 Chimera is derived from the Greek word "chimaira," meaning "she-goat." It re-
fers to an impossible or foolish fancy. WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 233 (9th ed.
1983).
113 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2294.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 2294-95.
116 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 6002; Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)). See
supra note 110.
117 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295 (citing Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460-62 (holding that deriva-
tive use of compelled testimony is coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege, and
grant of immunity "imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the
evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of
the compelled testimony")).
118 Id.
119 Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist claimed, however, that this limitation does not amount
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Continuing, however, the Chief Justice stated that "[t]he Govern-
ment has the right ... to use the corporation's act of production
against the custodian."' 120
ChiefJustice Rehnquist distinguished these two uses as follows:
on the one hand, the government may not establish that it served
the subpoena upon the custodian or that the custodian produced
the documents; 121 on the other hand, the government may admit
into evidence the fact that the corporation produced the subpoe-
naed documents, knowing that the jury will "reasonably infer that
[the custodian] had possession of the documents or knowledge of
their contents."' 122 The Chief Justice acknowledged that the jury is
particularly likely to make such an inference when, as in Braswell, the
custodian holds an influential position within the organization.' 23
In accordance with the aforementioned analysis, the majority
affirmed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling that Braswell
could not resist the subpoena to produce the corporations' records
on the ground that the act of production might personally incrimi-
nate him in violation of the fifth amendment.' 24
IV. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Kennedy authored the dissenting opinion, in which
three justices joined. 125 The dissent asserted that the collective en-
tity doctrine was irrelevant to the issue of an act of production privi-
lege. 126 Justice Kennedy renounced the majority's limitation of
Curcio to oral testimony, and stated that the case's true hallmark is
the denial of compelled disclosure of one's thoughts or knowl-
edge.127 The dissent rebuked Chief Justice Rehnquist's heavy reli-
ance on agency principles and pointed out that the agency rationale
was undermined by the Court's own attempt to mitigate the severity
of its holding.' 28 Finally, Justice Kennedy rejected the notion that
considerations of government's prosecutorial convenience should
to constructive use immunity which the Court prohibited in United States v. Doe. Id.
n.1 1 (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 616-17 (1984)). But see infra notes 182-
83, 247-51, and accompanying text.





125 Id. at 2296 (Kennedy,J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Scaliajoined
in Justice Kennedy's opinion.
126 Id. at 2297-98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 2300' (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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have any place in fifth amendment analysis.' 29
Justice Kennedy stated that the extensive common law develop-
ment of fifth amendment analysis concerning artificial entities has
solidified two basic principles of the self-incrimination clause: "first,
that it is an explicit right of a natural person, protecting the realm of
human thought and expression; second, that it is confined to gov-
ernmental compulsion."' 30 The dissent asserted that the majority
impaired these principles by holding that the government may com-
pel incriminating testimony from an individual who is the target of a
criminal investigation.'31 The Court reasoned, according to the dis-
sent, that an employee of an artificial entity has no fifth amendment
privilege simply because the entity itself has none. 132
Justice Kennedy stated that there is "no historical or logical re-
lation between the so-called collective entity rule and [Braswell's
claimed act of production] privilege."' 33 To support this statement,
the dissent traced the common law elements of the fifth amendment
privilege. Justice Kennedy reiterated that the Court prohibited the
compelled production of private documents in Boyd. 134 The dissent
also noted, however, that Boyd "generated nearly a century of doc-
trinal ambiguity as [the Court] explored its rationale and sought to
define its protection for the contents of business records under the
Fifth Amendment."' 3 5 Justice Kennedy stated that the Court in Doe
rejected Boyd's privacy rationale. 136 According to the dissent, Doe
held that the contents of business documents are not privileged un-
less the subpoenaed party proves that the documents were created
under government compulsion.137
129 Id. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 2296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent declared that the majority "denie[d] an
individual his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in order to vindicate
the rule that a collective entity which employs him has no such privilege itself." Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
132 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
133 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy prefaced this statement by noting
that the majority and the dissent agreed that: 1) artificial entities have no privilege;
2) individuals may not claim a privilege on behalf of an artificial entity; 3) the contents of
business documents are not protected under the fifth amendment; and 4) both sides
admitted that compelling Braswell to produce the subpoenaed documents would per-
sonally incriminate him. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 2296-97 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
622 (1886)). See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
135 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent also quoted
Fisher v. United States for the proposition that " '[sleveral of Boyd's express or implicit
declarations have not stood the test of time.'" Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting
Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 407 (1976)).
136 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984)).
137 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(citing Doe, 465 U.S. at 610 n.8).
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The dissent observed, however, that a subpoena compels the
production of documents and not their creation. 138 Justice Kennedy
asserted that the Court acknowledged this distinction in Fisher.'3 9
According to Justice Kennedy, Fisher held that an individual's act of
producing documents may constitute compelled testimony.140 Fur-
thermore, the dissent noted, the Court in Doe refused to grant a fifth
amendment privilege based on the contents of a proprietor's docu-
ments, but held nonetheless that the production of the documents
was privileged.' 4 1 Justice Kennedy underscored this fact, stating
that the Doe "holding did not depend on who owned the papers,
how they were created, or what they said; instead, [the Court's deci-
sion] rested on the fact that 'the act of producing the documents
would involve testimonial self-incrimination.' "142 From the Court's
decision in Doe, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the government's
own assumption - that Braswell's act of producing the documents
would result in testimonial self-incrimination 43 - was sufficient to
grant Braswell's claimed privilege.144
Justice Kennedy identified the issue in Braswell as "whether an
individual may be compelled, simply by virtue of his status as a cor-
porate custodian, to perform a testimonial act which will incriminate
him personally."'' 45 Justice Kennedy recognized that the majority
relied on the collective entity doctrine to answer that question af-
firmatively. The dissent asserted, however, that the collective entity
doctrine was irrelevant to Braswell's claim.' 46 The dissent defined
the scope of the collective entity doctrine as three-pronged: first, a
corporation may not assert a fifth amendment privilege to resist a
138 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This fact supports the notion that the contents of
business documents are not protected under the fifth amendment but the act of produc-
ing documents may be privileged. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 612.
139 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
140 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy asserted that the act of production
communicates the authenticity of the documents, and their possession or control by the
custodian. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy posited that "[tihose asser-
tions can convey information about that individual's knowledge and state of mind as
effectively as spoken statements, and the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from
having such assertions compelled by their own acts." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
141 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(citing Doe, 465 U.S. at 612-14).
142 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(quoting Doe, 465 U.S. at 613).
143 Justice Kennedy highlighted the fact that the government "submit[ted] the case to
us on the assumption that the act of producing the subpoenaed documents [would] ef-
fect [the] personal incrimination of Randy Braswell ." Id. at 2296 (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). See id. at 2297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 26,
36, Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988) (No. 87-3)).
144 Id. at 2297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
145 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
146 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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subpoena to produce documents; 147 second, this principle applies
to unincorporated organizations, such as labor unions 48 and part-
nerships; 49 and third, an organization's record custodian may not
resist a subpoena to produce documents by asserting a privilege as
to the documents' contents. 150
Justice Kennedy stated, however, that none of the Supreme
Court's decisions applying the collective entity doctrine dealt with
the issue of a custodian's self-incrimination through the compelled
act of production. 151 The dissent noted particularly that Wilson pre-
mised its rejection of a claimed fifth amendment privilege on the
incriminating nature of the documents' contents. 152 Moreover, ac-
cording to Justice Kennedy, Wilson reflected the Court's concern
with maintaining the state's visitatorial powers over corporations, a
concern which is predicated on the content of business records. 153
Justice Kennedy distinguished the act of production privilege
from a privilege as to the content of documents as follows: "While a
custodian has no necessary relation to the contents of documents
within his control, the act of production is inescapably his own. Pro-
duction is the precise act compelled by the subpoena, and obedi-
ence, in some cases, will require the custodian's own testimonial
assertions." 154 The dissent asserted that this principle was the foun-
dation of the privilege granted in Doe.155 Justice Kennedy also as-
serted that, while Doe involved the production of a proprietorship's
records as opposed to a corporation's, "the potential for self-incrim-
ination inheres in the act demanded of the individual, and as a con-
sequence the nature of the entity is irrelevant to determining
whether there is ground for the privilege."' 156
According to the dissent, the focus of the Court's fifth amend-
ment analysis shifted in Fisher and Doe away from an agency rationale
toward the principle of compulsion. 157 Thus, Justice Kennedy
noted that Fisher rejected the claim that voluntarily prepared busi-
147 Id. at 2297-98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)).
148 Id. at 2298 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694
(1944)).
149 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974)).
150 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(citing Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 363
(1911)).
151 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
152 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
153 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
154 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
155 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
156 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
157 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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ness documents were protected under the fifth amendment.158
Notwithstanding this shift, Justice Kennedy reaffirmed the validity of
the principles underlying the collective entity doctrine.159 He com-
mented, however, that a collective entity custodian is now prohib-
ited from asserting a fifth amendment privilege as to the contents of
entity documents, not because of the status of the entity, but
because business documents generally are not created by
compulsion.160
The dissent analogized the testimonial act of production or-
dered of Braswell to the testimonial act compelled in Curcio.t6'
Justice Kennedy stated that the government in Curcio subpoenaed a
labor union custodian to give oral testimony on the whereabouts of
certain union documents.162 Justice Kennedy observed that, at the
time of Curcio, the Court had previously determined that a union was
a collective entity for fifth amendment purposes. 63 Nevertheless,
the dissent noted, the Court rejected the government's argument
that the custodian was acting in a representative capacity, and held
instead that compelling him to testify on the location of documents
would " 'require[] him to disclose the contents of his own mind....
That is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Fifth
Amendment.' 164
The dissent rebuffed ChiefJustice Rehnquist's limitation of the
Curcio holding to compelled oral testimony.' 65 Justice Kennedy
158 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
159 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Kennedy would argue that a corpora-
tion or other collective entity is still precluded from asserting a fifth amendment privi-
lege on its own behalf and that a custodian is still precluded from asserting a privilege
with respect to the contents of collective entity documents. See supra notes 147-50 and
accompanying text.
160 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2298-99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy empha-
sized that the issue before the Court was "not the existence of the collective entity rule,
but whether it contains any principle which overrides the personal Fifth Amendment
privilege of someone compelled to give incriminating testimony." Id. at 2299 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(citing Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118
(1957)). Justice Kennedy stated that the Court should analyze Braswell's act of produc-
tion in relation to other compelled acts which the Court has examined. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
162 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
163 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Court established this principle in United States
v. White, 322 U.S. at 694. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
164 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(quoting Curdo, 354 U.S. at
128).
165 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy criticized the majority, stating that it
"is able to distinguish Curcio only by giving much apparent weight to the words 'out of
his own mouth,' reading Curcio to stand for the proposition that the Constitution treats
oral testimony different than it does other forms of assertion." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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wrote, "[t]here is no basis in the text or history of the Fifth Amend-
ment for such a distinction. The self-incrimination clause speaks of
compelled 'testimony,' and has always been understood to apply to
testimony in all its forms."' 166 Justice Kennedy instead proferred
that the true distinction promulgated in Curcio is between "a sub-
poena which compels a person to 'disclose the contents of his own
mind,' through words or actions, and one which does not."' 67
The dissent also criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist's pervasive
reliance on agency principles to support the Court's holding. 68
The dissent stated that "[t]he majority gives the corporate agent fic-
tion a weight it simply cannot bear."' 169 Justice Kennedy noted that
the majority concluded from simple agency principles that a custo-
dian's compliance with a subpoena is exclusively the act of the or-
ganization.' 7 0  Justice Kennedy asserted, however, that this
conclusion contradicted Curcio, in which the Court held that a union
officer's "testimony ... may not be divorced from the person who
speaks it."171
In an attempt to cut through the majority's abstruse agency ra-
tionale, Justice Kennedy challenged that "It]he heart of the matter,
as everyone knows, is that the Government does not see Braswell as
a mere agent at all; and the majority's theory is difficult to square
with what will often be the Government's actual practice."'172 Thus,
the dissent noted that the government addressed the subpoena spe-
cifically to Braswell and not to the corporations;17 3 the subpoena
ordered Braswell to personally produce the stated documents; 174
and the government defended this policy by admitting that it
166 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(citing Doe v. United States
(Doe II), 108 S. Ct. 2341, 2347 n.8 (1988)).
167 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Curcio, 354 U.S. at 128). Justice Kennedy also
noted that:
A custodian who is incriminated simply by the contents of the documents he has
physically transmitted has not been compelled to disclose his memory or perception
or cognition. A custodian who is incriminated by the personal knowledge he com-
municates in locating and selecting the document demanded in a Government sub-
poena has been compelled to testify in the most elemental, constitutional sense.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy referred to the majority's
agency rationale as a "metaphysical progression, which, I respectfully submit, is flawed."
Id. at 2299-2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
170 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that the production of docu-
ments required Braswell to disclose personal knowledge which could not be attributed
to the corporations merely by calling Braswell an agent. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
172 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
173 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
174 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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wanted to force the specific target of the investigation to comply
with the subpoena.' 7 5 Justice Kennedy contended that "[t]his is not
the language of agency. By issuing a subpoena which the Govern-
ment insists is 'directed to petitioner personally,' it has forfeited any
claim that it is simply making a demand on a corporation that, in
turn, will have to find a physical agent to perform its duty."' 76 The
dissent also argued that the agency relationship is particularly illu-
sory when the government admits, as it did in Braswell, that the cus-
todian's act of production is implicitly testimonial. 177
Justice Kennedy charged that the majority undermined its own
agency rationale by holding that the government may compel the
custodian's act of production, but may not admit into evidence the
fact that he performed the act. 178 Justice Kennedy questioned the
Court's authority for ruling that such evidence is inadmissible. 179
The dissent pointed out that the fifth amendment is the sole author-
ity for declaring relevant evidence inadmissible when a defendant
reveals the information through his or her own actions.18 0 Yet if the
fifth amendment prohibits the admission of act of production evi-
dence, Justice Kennedy stated that "it is because the Fifth Amend-
ment protects the person without regard to his status as a corporate
employee; and once this be admitted, the necessary [agency ration-
ale] for the majority's case has collapsed."''
The dissent also criticized the majority for contradicting the
Court's holding in Doe, in which it ruled that a court may grant im-
munity only after a formal request pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002
and 6003.182 In contrast to Doe, the dissent stated, the majority
opinion results in "'new judicially created evidentiary rules, confer-
ring upon individuals . . . [constructive] immunity to avoid results
175 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Braswell v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988)(No. 87-3)).
176 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(citation omitted).
177 Id. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated that to hold other-
wise "'is to confuse metaphor with reality.'" Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(quoting Pa-
cific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 475 U.S. 1, 33
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
178 Id. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy labelled this retreat "a pe-
culiar attempt to mitigate the force of (the Court's] own holding." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
179 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180 Id. (Kennedy, J,, dissenting).
181 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 2300-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy noted that Doe "rejected
the argument that compelled production necessarily carried with it a grant of construc-
tive immunity." Id. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the Court finds constitutionally intolerable."'' 8 3
Finally, the dissent disagreed with the majority's concern over
the government's ability to regulate white-collar crime, asserting
that "the Fifth Amendment does not authorize exceptions premised
on such rationales."' 184 Justice Kennedy noted that the majority ex-
aggerated the dangers of recognizing an act of production privi-
lege. 185 Justice Kennedy reminded the majority that the Court
would grant a privilege only on a case-by-case basis when the custo-
dian could prove as a factual issue that his act of production would
be both testimonial and self-incriminating. 186 The dissent recalled
that Fisher denied a fifth amendment privilege where " 'the existence
and location of the papers [were] a foregone conclusion,' " and ac-
cordingly, the act of production was not sufficiently testimonial. 187
Justice Kennedy also noted that the government would need to
request statutory immunity only for the custodian and only with re-
spect to the act of production. 18 8 He stated that this would allow
the government to: receive the documents necessary for prosecu-
tion; 189 use the contents of the documents as evidence against any-
one, including the custodian;190 and utilize the testimony implicit in
the custodian's act of production against everyone but the custodian
himself.19 1
According to Justice Kennedy, the majority implied that a cus-
todian waives his fifth amendment right by accepting employment as
the agent of a collective entity. 192 Justice Kennedy noted, however,
that most people are not able to choose their employer, let alone
their employers' business structure. 193 Furthermore, the dissent
pointed out, there is no basis for holding that acceptance of employ-
183 Id. at 2301 (Kennedy,J., dissenting). But see supra notes 118-19 and accompanying
text.
184 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
185 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
186 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(citing Doe v. United States (Doe I1), 108 S. Ct. 2341
(1988)).
187 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411
(1976)). Note also that Doe I1 similarly rejected a claimed fifth amendment privilege
where the Court found that a petitioner's compliance with a consent directive was not
sufficiently testimonial. Doe II, 108 S. Ct. at 2352.
188 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
189 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
191 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy admitted that, in this regard, Bras-
well's case was not very sympathetic, for he voluntarily chose to incorporate his busi-
nesses. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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ment constitutes a waiver of constitutional rights. 194
The dissent concluded by charging that the majority's denial of
the act of production privilege, and its blindness to the govern-
ment's obvious desire to personally incriminate Braswell, was "fac-
tually unsound, unnecessary for legitimate regulation, and a
violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution."1 95
V. ANALYSIS
In Braswell v. United States,196 the United States Supreme Court
attempted to breathe life into a collective entity doctrine that the
Court laid to rest in Fisher v. United States 197 and United States v.
Doe.198 The Court's decision was iniquitous, for it stripped Randy
Braswell, *the target of a federal investigation, of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. 199 The decision was misguided in
its dogged adherence to agency principles, thereby creating a dual-
istic record custodian.200 Thus, while the government conducted a
grand jury investigation of Braswell as an individual, the majority
steadfastly refused to accord him that same status, opting instead to
label Braswell as the agent of a collective entity. Finally, the Court's
decision was untimely, for it reaffirmed the collective entity doctrine
which the lower courts, and the Court itself, had struggled to apply
and begun to drift away from in favor of a more uniform and easily
applied compelled testimony standard.201
A. THE MAJORITY'S MISAPPLIED AGENCY RATIONALE
The Braswell majority relied extensively on agency principles to
distinguish Braswell from the two corporations20 2 and to reject
Braswell's claimed act of production privilege.203 The Court histor-
ically distinguished between the individual and the entity as a con-
comitant to the Court's privacy rationale. 20 4 The Court in Fisher and
194 Id. (Kennedy. J., dissenting).
195 Id. at 2301-02 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
196 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988).
197 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
198 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
199 See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
200 See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
201 See infra notes 205-06, 228-33, and accompanying text.
202 Braswell operated two corporations, Worldwide Purchasing, Inc. and Worldwide
Machinery Sales, Inc. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286. See supra notes 16-30 and accompany-
ing text.
203 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. But see supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
204 After Boyd v. United States held that the compulsory production of "private pa-
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Doe, however, explicitly rejected the privacy rationale as a basis for
fifth amendment analysis. 20 5 Instead, the Court stated that the fifth
amendment "protects a person only against being incriminated by his
own compelled testimonial communications. ' 20 6 While the agency
distinction between the individual and the entity was a necessary
offshoot of a privacy standard, it has no logical connection to the
inquiry of whether there is compelled testimonial incrimination. 20 7
Thus, the Braswell majority erred in relying on agency principles as
the thread holding together the Court's "metaphysical
progression.- 2 08
The agency distinction was particularly tenuous under the facts
of Braswell. Braswell produced substantial evidence at trial showing
that the corporations had no identity apart from his own. 209 Bras-
pers" was unconstitutional, the Court necessarily distinguished individuals from entities
as a means of determining the privacy of the documents subpoenaed. See Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). See also, Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974);
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-88 (1946); United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694, 699 (1944); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489 (1913); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361, 377-78 (1911); Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394, 400 (1911).
205 The Court declared in Fisher that "[w]e adhere to the view that the Fifth Amend-
ment protects against 'compelled self-incrimination, not [the disclosure] of private infor-
mation.' " Fisher, 425 U.S. at 401 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233
n.7 (1975)). The Fisher Court also criticized the Boyd decision, stating that "the prohibi-
tion against forcing the production of private papers has long been a rule searching for a
rationale consistent with the proscriptions of the Fifth Amendment against compelling a
person to give 'testimony' that incriminates him." Id. at 409. See also United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 n.8 (1984); Bradley, Constitutional Protection for Private Papers, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 461, 471-75 (1981) ("[I]t is no more self-incriminating to rec-
ord evidence of a crime in a diary than in a business record. And a search for such a
diary involves no more compulsion than does a search for business records.").
206 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409 (emphasis added) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 761 (1966); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967); Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967)). The Court thus identified three factors to be dispositive of
fifth amendment protection under the compelled testimony standard: compulsion, testi-
monial communication, and personal incrimination. Id. at 410. See also Doe v. United
States (Doe I), 108 S. Ct. 2341, 2345-46, 2347 n.8 (1988); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S.
at 613; Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973); Curcio v. United States, 354
U.S. 118, 128 (1957).
207 The distinction between an individual and an entity made sense under a privacy
standard as a means of determining the availability of a fifth amendment privilege. See
supra note 204 and accompanying text. Documents belonging to the individual were
considered private and therefore were protected; those belonging to an artificial entity
were deemed not private and thus were not protected. There is no relationship, how-
ever, between the distinction of the individual from the entity, and the Court's three
criteria for determining a fifth amendment privilege - compulsion, testimony, and in-
crimination. See Note, Organizational Papers and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99
HARV. L. REV. 640, 647 (1986) [hereinafter Organizational Papers] (suggesting that courts
should not distinguish between personal and organizational records for fifth amendment
purposes).
208 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299-300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
209 Braswell introduced into evidence twelve facts that supported his claim:
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well also introduced evidence that he incorporated his sole proprie-
torships merely for the sake of appearance 210 and not to reap the
traditional benefit of limited personal liability for corporate
debts.211 Furthermore, Braswell claimed a fifth amendment privi-
lege in response to a federal investigation of him personally on pos-
(1) Randy Braswell owns, and has always owned 100%o of the stock of the active
corporation.
(2) The corporation has only one employee other than Randy Braswell, this be-
ing the secretary, who is Braswell's sister-in-law.
(3) Braswell's authority over the corporation is "absolute, total, [and] complete."
(4) Braswell has no personal checking account, only the corporate one.
(5) Braswell's personal expenses, and those of his wife, are paid out of the corpo-
rate checking account.
(6) Randy Braswell is the only individual who has the authority to act on behalf of
the corporation, and is the only person who has ever acted on behalf of the
corporation.
(7) Braswell has total control over the contents of the records of the business.
(8) These records reflect all of Braswell's financial transactions, personal as well
as business.
(9) The credit cards used by Braswell and his wife for personal expenditures are
in the name of the corporation.
(10) No bank loans to the corporation were ever made by Ray Price, Jr., Braswell's
primary banker, without Braswell's personal guarantee.
(11) Other individuals doing business with Worldwide Purchasing, Inc., view
themselves as actually doing business with Randy Braswell.
(12) Braswell even acquired the nackname "Worldwide," an indication that others
in the business community viewed him as being synonymous with the corporation.
Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988)(No. 87-3).
Moreover, the district court recognized that Braswell and his businesses were actu-
ally one and the same, stating that "the question before [the court] was whether 'the
holding of United States v. Doe [should] be applied to [Braswell's] records even though
they're corporate in form because as a practical matter they are sole proprietorship form, sole
proprietorship records, and .... should not be produced under any circumstances.' " Id. at 6 (quot-
ing Trial Transcript at 77)(emphasis added). The district court nonetheless relied on
the broad rule enunciated in Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974), to reject Bras-
well's claimed privilege. Brief for Petitioner at 6. But see supra note 82 for another view
of Bellis.
210 The attorney who incorporated Braswell's businesses testified that:
Randy had gotten to the point where it had been a hinderance [sic] to do business
as an individual, as a matter of form .... It hurt you as far as business was con-
cerned to go in and say I'm Randy Braswell from Magnolia, Mississippi. We felt it
was [an] advantage to us strictly as a matter of form to incorporate.
Brief for Petitioner at 4.
211 This claim was supported by the fact that Braswell had personally guaranteed the
corporations' debts, and thus was not attempting to limit his liability for potential busi-
ness failure. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub
nom. Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988). See also supra note 209. The
incorporating attorney also testified that there were no income tax, pension or profit
sharing reasons for Braswell's incorporating his businesses. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
It should be noted, however, that aside from the limited personal liability for corpo-
rate debts, corporate officers and directors are shielded from personal liability for torts
committed by the corporation. Barry v. Legler, 39 F.2d 297, 300 (8th Cir. 1930). Thus,
Braswell would have benefited from the corporate form if either corporation was found
liable for damages in a tort action.
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sible charges of personal income tax fraud. 212 These facts illustrate
that Braswell was not merely a representative agent of a larger in-
dependent entity, as the majority implied.
The majority's rejection of Braswell's personal fifth amendment
privilege, premised heavily on a supposed distinction between Bras-
well and the corporate entities, resulted in a decision that contra-
dicted the Court's very own analysis. Indeed, the Court's stubborn
adherence to its agency rationale created a dualistic record custo-
dian: while the government viewed Braswell as an individual, the
Court effectively viewed Braswell as a corporate entity, and accord-
ingly denied his claimed personal privilege; in doing so, however,
the Court allowed the government to prosecute Braswell as an indi-
vidual despite the Court's insistence that he was not an individual
possessing a personal fifth amendment right.213
The majority's analysis also reaffirmed a distinction, which the
Court itself has struggled to define, between employees of various
business organizations.2 14 Thus, while the Court has rejected
claimed fifth amendment privileges with respect to corporate2 1 5 and
labor union documents, 2 16 the Court nonetheless has allowed a fifth
amendment privilege for producing proprietorship records. 2 17 The
Court's struggle to distinguish between employees of various busi-
ness organizations has resulted in considerable confusion as is evi-
denced by Chief Justice Rehnquist's closing statement in Braswell.
After rejecting the fifth amendment claim of Randy Braswell, the
President, sole shareholder, and virtually sole employee of two cor-
porations, 218 the Chief Justice stated:
212 Brief for Petitioner at 40. See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 104 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing)(Justice Douglas argued for a fifth amendment privilege when the government inves-
tigated a partnership custodian personally, but did not investigate the partnership). But
see Bellis. 417 U.S. at 97 n.8.
213 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2291, 2295, 2300.
214 The Court's struggle to draw the line between permissible and impermissible busi-
ness organizations for fifth amendment purposes was evidenced in Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. at 85. In Bellis, the Court rejected a claimed fifth amendment privilege
as to the records of a three-member partnership, but stated that "[t]his might be a differ-
ent case if it involved a small family partnership." Id. at 101.
215 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 386 (1911).
216 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 704 (1944).
217 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984).
218 Braswell was the sole shareholder of the corporations. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286.
He was one of two corporate employees, the other being a sister-in-law who performed
secretarial work. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284
(1988) (No. 87-3). He was also the President and controlling officer of both corporations,
because neither of the other two officers - his wife and his mother - had authority over




We leave open the question [of] whether the [collective entity doc-
trine] supports compelling a custodian to produce corporate records
when the custodian is able to establish, by showing for example that he
is the sole employee and officer of the corporation, that the jury would
inevitably conclude that he produced the records. 2 19
This statement underscores two points of questionable precedential
value. First, the Court was willing to determine the availability of a
custodian's fifth amendment privilege based on whether the custo-
dian had a secretary, or had appointed two figurehead co-officers. 220
Secondly, while the majority resisted applying the compelled testi-
mony standard, the Chief Justice's statement endorsed the use of
the standard, in principle if not in name, for a claimed act of produc-
tion privilege.2 2 '
B. THE COMPELLED TESTIMONY STANDARD: A PREFERABLE FIFTH
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The compelled testimony standard is preferable to the collec-
tive entity doctrine as a standard for fifth amendment analysis. The
compelled testimony standard ignores the agency rationale that re-
sults in a dualistic record custodian;2 2 2 it is easier for the courts to
apply;2 23 and it permits uniform treatment of individuals regardless
of their employers' business structure.2 24 Contrary to what Chief
Justice Rehnquist implied, adopting the compelled testimony stan-
dard would not set back fifth amendment analysis eighty years. 225
In fact, the compelled testimony standard embraces the same princi-
ples as the collective entity doctrine, but does so with less confusion
219 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295 n.ll.
220 See supra note 218. While the Court rejected Braswell's claimed privilege as the
controlling officer and virtual sole employee, the Court's statement implied that the de-
cision might be different if Braswell were the sole officer and employee of the corpora-
tions. This is not the proper place, however, to draw a line for determining the
availability of a constitutional right. The preferable place, as advocated by the com-
pelled testimony standard, is between a subpoena which compels testimonial incrimina-
tion and one which does not. See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
221 ChiefJustice Rehnquist's statement implied that the availability of a fifth amend-
ment privilege depends upon whether the compelled production of documents com-
municates incriminating information to thejury. The Court thus premised the right to a
fifth amendment privilege on the existence of the three factors - compelled incriminat-
ing testimony - that comprise the compelled testimony standard. It is interesting to
note that the Court implicitly endorsed the standard that it refused to apply to Braswell.
222 See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
223 See infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
224 See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
225 According to the ChiefJustice, Braswell argued that Fisher and Doe overruled the
collective entity doctrine, which the Court has advocated since Hale v. Henkel in 1906.
Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2290.
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and without the troublesome distinctions evidenced in Braswell.226
Under the compelled testimony standard, a court determines
the availability of a fifth amendment privilege simply by examining
whether the government is attempting to compel incriminating tes-
timony.227 This analysis precludes the use of agency principles to
distinguish between the individual and the entity. It thus avoids the
dualistic custodian result, where one custodian is simultaneously
prosecuted as an individual and held by the court to represent an
artificial entity.
The compelled testimony standard also eliminates the need for
courts to distinguish between permissible and impermissible busi-
ness organizations for fifth amendment purposes. 228 This results in
a fifth amendment analysis that is easier for the courts to apply, for
the court uses only one standard regardless of the employment of
the individual claiming the privilege.229
The compelled testimony standard thus also results in the uni-
226 See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2298 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The collective entity rule
established in Hale v. Henkel, and extended in White and Bellis, remains valid."). Thus,
like the collective entity doctrine, the compelled testimony standard recognizes that an
artificial entity may not claim a fifth amendment privilege, nor may an individual claim a
privilege on behalf of the entity. The fifth amendment privilege is a personal privilege,
available only to a natural individual upon his own request. See Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944); 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2259b at 355 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)("The privilege covers
only disclosure by the person claiming the privilege and not disclosure by any other
person.").
The compelled testimony standard is also in accord with the collective entity doc-
trine in that a custodian may not claim a privilege as to the contents of business docu-
ments. The collective entity doctrine reaches this conclusion by distinguishing between
the individual and the artificial entity, and by attempting to place the given business
within a range of permissible or impermissible artificial entities. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at
2287. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. The compelled testimony stan-
dard reaches the same conclusion simply by noting that the contents of voluntarily pre-
pared business documents fail the standard's compulsion test. Doe v. United States (Doe
I!), 108 S. Ct. 2341, 2345 (1988); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610, 612 & n.10
(1984).
227 See Doe H, 108 S. Ct. at 2347; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
228 The only relevant criterion under the compelled testimony standard is whether the
individual is compelled to give incriminating, testimonial communication. Doe II, 108 S.
Ct. at 2347 n.8; Doe, 465 U.S. at 613; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409; Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761.
See supra notes 206, 227 and accompanying text. Thus, distinctions between various
types of business organizations are irrelevant. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying
text for examples of the confusion that such distinctions generate.
229 Thus, the court would determine the availability of a fifth amendment privilege by
applying the three compelled testimony criteria, regardless of whether the individual
worked for a corporation, operated a proprietorship, or was even unemployed. This
simplifies the court's analysis and avoids the confusion of competing standards. See infra
note 230 and accompanying text.
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form treatment of corporate and noncorporate custodians. 23 0
While the collective entity doctrine has led the Court to distinguish
between a corporation with one employee and one with two employ-
ees, 23 1 and between a small law firm partnership and a small family
partnership, 23 2 the Bellis Court asserted that "the applicability of the
fifth amendment privilege should not turn on an insubstantial differ-
ence in the form of the business enterprise." 23 3 Such distinctions
are irrelevant in the application of the compelled testimony stan-
dard. The standard applies uniformly to all individuals, and thus is
preferable to the doctrine that the majority applied in Braswell.
C. APPLYING THE COMPELLED TESTIMONY STANDARD TO BRASWELL:
THE MAJORITY'S FAILURES
Applying the compelled testimony standard to the facts of Bras-
well reveals that the majority erred in rejecting Braswell's claimed
act of production privilege.23 4 First, the government's subpoena
compelled Braswell to produce the stated documents. 23 5 Secondly,
Braswell's production of documents would have been testimonial.23 6
230 The inequitable treatment that results from the Court's use of competing stan-
dards is evidenced by the decisions rendered in Braswell and Doe. In Braswell the Court
applied the collective entity doctrine to reject Randy Braswell's act of production privi-
lege. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295. In Doe, the Court employed the compelled testimony
standard and granted the same act of production privilege to a sole proprietor. Doe, 465
U.S. at 617.
231 See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
232 See supra note 214.
233 Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974).
234 Braswell claimed neither that the contents of the documents were protected under
the fifth amendment, nor that the corporations could assert a privilege with respect to
the documents. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. 2287. Rather, Braswell claimed that his act of pro-
ducing the documents pursuant to the government's subpoena had "independent testi-
monial significance" which would tend to incriminate him in violation of the fifth
amendment. Id.
See Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege for Producing Corporate Documents, 84 MicH. L. REV.
1544, 1549-54 (1986) [hereinafter Fifth Amendment Privilege], for a detailed analysis of
each of the three elements of the compelled testimony standard.
235 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286. As Justice Kennedy noted, the fifth amendment does
not protect the content of business documents because the creation of such documents
is usually not compelled. Id. at 2298-99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Doe 465 U.S.
at 612 n. 10 ("If the party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily com-
piled the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the documents are not
privileged.") (emphasis added); Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 6, 40-41 (1986) (distinguishing the
self-incriminating nature of the act of production from the content of documents). Be-
cause Braswell claimed a privilege only as to the act of production, however, the fact that
the subpoena compelled his production was sufficient.
236 The testimonial nature of an individual's act of production was recognized as early
as 1904 by John Henry Wigmore. According to Professor Wigmore:
It follows that the production of documents or chattels by a person... in response
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Braswell's act of production would have communicated that the doc-
uments existed, that they were in his possession, and that he be-
lieved them to be authentic. 237 Moreover, the broad scope of the
subpoena 238 indicated that the government was " 'attempting to
compensate for its lack of knowledge by requiring [the custodian] to
become, in effect, the primary informant against himself.' "239
to a supboena ... may be refused under the protection of the [fifth amendment]
privilege.... For though the documents or chattels thus sought be not oral in
form, and though they be already in existence and not desired to be first written and
created by a testimonial act or utterance of the person in response to the process,
still there is a testimonial disclosure implicit in their production.
8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 at 379-80 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)(emphasis omit-
ted).
The Court later acknowledged the act of production doctrine in Curcio when it
stated that "[t]he custodian's act of producing books or records in response to a sub-
poena duces tecum is itself a representation that the documents produced are those
demanded by the subpoena." Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)(empha-
sis omitted). See also Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 ("The act of producing evidence in response
to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the
contents of the papers produced."); Doe, 465 U.S. at 612.
237 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410; Doe, 465 U.S. at 613 n. 11. The Court noted in Fisher
that the " 'implicit authentication' rationale appears to be the prevailing justification for
the Fifth Amendment's application to documentary subpoenas." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 412
n.12 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 344, 346 (1973); United States v. Beattie, 522 F.2d 267, 270 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 970 (1976) (Friendly, J.); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2264 at 380 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)("[T]here is a testimonial disclosure in their
production.... that the acticles produced are the ones demanded."); C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 126 (3d. 1984); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 27, 150 N.E. 585, 590
(1926)(Cardozo,J.)). See also Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2287 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410).
The government may counter a custodian's claim, that the production of documents
is implicitly testimonial, by proving the existence, location, and authenticity of the docu-
ments through evidence wholly independent of the custodian's act of production. Thus
the custodian's production would add nothing to the case against him. See Fisher, 425
U.S. at 411 (the "foregone conclusion" test); Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13. See also Note,
Pleading the Fifth: Record Custodians and the Act of Production Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
633, 640 (1987) ("[The] foregone conclusion test was the [Fisher] Court's way of insur-
ing that not every act of production which could potentially be characterized as testimo-
nial would be granted fifth amendment protection."); Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege,
supra note 234, at 1553-54 ("[T]he 'foregone conclusion' test designates an admission as
nonincriminating if there is so much other evidence to prove the fact admitted that the
government is not likely to use that particular admission as its means of proof."). But see
Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents - Cutting Fisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo.
L. REV. 439, 480-82 (1984)(arguing that the prosecution's and the court's inability to
make judgments about the existence, location, and authenticity of documents before
they are produced naturally works to the advantage of the claimant). Given the broad
scope of the subpoenas issued to Braswell, however, and the degree of Braswell's con-
trol over both the corporations and their records, it is doubtful that the government
could have proven the documents' existence, location, and authenticity without Bras-
well's act of production. See supra notes 26-30, 33, and accompanying text.
238 See supra note 33.
239 Doe, 465 U.S. at 613 n.12 (quoting In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980,
680 F.2d 327, 335 (3d Cir. 1982)).
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Thirdly, the government conceded that compelling Braswell to pro-
duce the documents would personallly incriminate him.240 Thus, the
elements of the compelled standard were satisfied, and accordingly
the Court should have granted Braswell's claimed act of production
privilege.
As Justice Kennedy correctly argued, the majority's concern
with regulating white-collar crime was both misplaced and over-
stated.241 The concern was misplaced because the fifth amendment
does not permit balancing the state's interest in prosecution against
an individual's constitutional rights. 242 Furthermore, granting a
fifth amendment privilege and requesting statutory immunity for the
custodian's act of production would enable the government to ob-
tain all documents necessary to conduct its investigation. 243 The
government could use the contents of the documents to prosecute
anyone, including the custodian.244 The government could also use
any testimony implicit in the custodian's act of production against
anyone except the custodian.245 Thus, granting a fifth amendment
privilege would hinder the government's ability to regulate white-
collar crime only when the act of production testimony is both criti-
cal to the government's case against the custodian, and unobtain-
able from sources independent of the custodian's act of
production. 246
240 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. 2296, 2299, 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
241 Id. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See generally White Collar Crime: Third Annual
Survey of Law, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 279, 559-577 (1984)[hereinafter White Collar
Crime] (surveying the case law on fifth amendment protection for the compelled produc-
tion of business documents).
242 One author has suggested that:
[t]he fifth amendment is concerned with procedural values: it maintains the integ-
rity of the law enforcement system by limiting the state's ability to demand a de-
fendant's participation in the determination of his own guilt. It is not concerned
with the substantive results of trials - that is, whether or not guilt is established.
Hence, the fact that... the privilege might make prosecution more difficult should
be of little, if any, relevance.
Organizational Papers, supra note 207, at 652 (footnote omitted).
243 See supra note 110 for the text of the statutes providing for immunity.
244 The Court has stated that "[t]o satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, a
grant of immunity need be only as broad as the privilege." Doe, 465 U.S. at 617 n.17
(citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 107 (1964)(White, J., concurring)).
Thus, when the court grants a fifth amendment privilege for the custodian's act of pro-
duction, he need be immunized only for the testimony derived from his act of produc-
tion. Doe explicitly rejected the notion that immunization for the act of production
necessarily covers the documents' contents. Doe, 465 U.S. at 617 n.17.
245 Doe, 465 U.S. at 617 n.17. See supra note 244.
246 See Thornburgh, Reconciling Effective Federal Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment:
"Criminal Coddling, " "The New Torture" or "A Rational Accommodation?", 67 J. CRM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 155, 156-58 (1976)(arguing that compelled production, accompanied by
statutory immunity, is neither " 'criminal coddling' nor a 'new torture,' " but is rather a
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The solution Justice Kennedy advocated, granting a fifth
amendment privilege with statutory immunity for the custodian's act
of production, is preferable to the majority's result of denying a
privilege but conferring constructive immunity.2 47 The Court in Doe
explicitly rejected the doctrine of court-conferred constructive use
immunity.248 The Court in Doe stated that the decision to seek im-
munity is the exclusive responsibility of the Justice Department, not
the judiciary, and thus held that a court may grant immunity only
pursuant to a formal statutory request by the government.249 While
the dissent characterized the majority's solution as "compelled pro-
duction [that] necessarily carrie[s] with it a grant of constructive im-
munity,"2 50 Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected that label and instead
called the Court's grant of limited immunity "a necessary concomi-
tant" to an agent's compelled production of documents.251 The dif-
ference is semantic. The majority conferred constructive use
immunity, in reality if not in name, and the use of such immunity
was expressly prohibited in Doe.
Finally, the majority incorrectly distinguished between oral tes-
timony and testimonial acts, holding that the latter are unprotected
under Curcio.252 This distinction was squarely contradicted the very
"'rational accommodation between the imperatives of the [fifth amendment] privilege
and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify.' "). See supra
note 237 regarding the "foregone conclusion" test. See also Organizational Papers, supra
note 207, at 650-51 (arguing that fifth amendment protection would not unduly hinder
the government's ability to prosecute white collar crime).
247 See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295, 2300-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority
rejected Braswell's claimed act of production privilege, but held instead that the govern-
ment could make no evidentiary use of the act against Braswell. Id. at 2295. ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist conceded, however, that the jury nonetheless would infer the
incriminating act of production testimony against Braswell, especially given the nature
and size of the corporations. Id. The veil of constitutional protection thus extended to
Braswell was a "chimera." See supra note 112 and accompanying text. The ChiefJustice
justified this result by relying further on the agency rationale, stating that "[b]ecause the
jury is not told that the defendant produced the records, any nexus between the defend-
ant and the documents results solely from the corporations's act of production." Braswell,
108 S. Ct. at 2295 (emphasis added). For a comprehensive discussion of criminal immu-
nity, see White Collar Crime, supra note 241, at 631-46.
248 Doe, 465 U.S. at 616.
249 Id. at 616-17 ("We decline to extend the jurisdiction of courts to include prospec-
tive grants of use immunity in the absence of the formal request that the statute
requires.").
250 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 2295 n.ll.
252 See supra notes 10 1-07 and accompanying text. Braswell relied on Curcio as a cor-
nerstone of his act of production claim. Curcio held that the government may not compel
a union custodian to give testimony about the union's records, and recognized that the
act of production is implicitly testimonial. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 123-25
(1957).
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same day as Braswel1253 by an eight-to-one Court in Doe H:
[T]he Fifth Amendment comes into play "only when the accused is
compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminat-
ing.". . . Petitioner has articulated no cogent argument as to why the
"testimonial" requirement should have one meaning in the context of
acts, and another meaning in the context of verbal statements. 254
Thus, the fifth amendment protects both oral testimony and testi-
monial acts. 2 55 The Braswell majority accordingly should have
granted a fifth amendment privilege for Braswell's testimonial act of
production.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Braswell v. United States, the United States Supreme Court de-
nied the fifth amendment right of a corporate custodian for his act
of producing corporate records pursuant to a subpoena. In doing
so, the Court reaffirmed the agency-based collective entity doctrine,
despite the Court's recent trend toward a fifth amendment analysis
that emphasizes protection against compelled, testimonial self-
incrimination.
The compelled testimony standard, however, is a preferable
standard of fifth amendment analysis. It is a simplified three-step
analysis that eliminates the need to distinguish between an individ-
ual and an entity in cases in which the difference is not readily ap-
parent. The compelled testimony standard eliminates the need for
courts to draw often contradictory distinctions between permissible
and impermissible business organizations for fifth amendment pur-
poses. The compelled testimony standard even embraces the same
principles as the collective entity doctrine, yet avoids the confusion
of competing standards. Most importantly, the compelled testi-
253 The Court rendered its decisions in Braswell and Doe II, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined the majority, on June 22, 1988. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2284; Doe v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 2341 (1988)(Doe II).
254 Doe II, 108 S. Ct. at 2347 n.8 (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408)(emphasis added in
Fisher).
255 See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)("Physical acts will consti-
tute testimony if they probe the state of mind, memory, perception, or cognition of the
witness. The Court should not retreat from the plain implications of this rule and hold
that such testimony may be compelled, even when self-incriminating, simply because it is
not spoken."); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 n.5 (1966)("A nod or a head-
shake is as much a 'testimonial' or 'communicative' act ... as are spoken words."). See
also Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and
the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 103, 122; Arenella, Schmerber




mony standard results in uniform constitutional protection for all
individuals regardless of their employment.
The Court stated in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n that the fifth
amendment privilege is rooted in:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice;
our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair
state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the indi-
vidual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by re-
quiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder
the entire load;" . . . our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and
our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the
guilty," is often a "protection to the innocent. 256
The compelled testimony standard is a truer champion of these in-
terests. The Braswell Court erred in applying the formalistic collec-
tive entity doctrine instead of the compelled testimony standard.
Applying the compelled testimony standard to Braswell reveals
that the Court erred in rejecting Braswell's claimed act of produc-
tion privilege. The government compelled Braswell to produce
documents; Braswell's production of the documents would have
communicated testimonial information, especially given the broad
scope of the subpoena; and, as the government conceded, Bras-
well's production would have effected self-incrimination.
Furthermore, the majority's concern with regulating white-col-
lar crime was misstated in degree, and misplaced in an examination
of an individual's constitutional rights. The majority conferred con-
structive immunity in disregard of the Court's own rule mandating
immunity only through formal statutory procedures. Moreover, the
majority's elimination of fifth amendment protection for testimonial
acts was both constitutionally unsound and contradicted almost im-
mediately by the Court. Thus, the Court maligned the purpose of
the fifth amendment, and its protection against compelled, testimo-
nial self-incrimination.
JOHN M. GROGAN, JR.
256 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)(quoting 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2251 at 317 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S.
155, 162 (1955))(citations omitted).
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